RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN BALI PREMODERN AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES

Mark Woodward
mark.woodward@asu.edu
Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict
Arizona State University

Abstract: This paper describes two modes of civic religious pluralism in Bali. The first is adaptive pluralism in which elements of Islam were incorporated into pre-modern Balinese states. Analysis focuses on the way in which Gusti Ayu Made Rai, an eighteenth-century Balinese princess became Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah, one Indonesia's few widely recognized female Muslim saints. This leads to an alternative reading of Balinese religious history, countering the view that it is a static monolithically Hindu tradition. Rather than turning inward as the surrounding areas embraced Islam, Balinese kingdoms included Muslims and Islam in scared narratives and geographies. Today this integrative strategy functions only at the local level. Pilgrimage to her grave by Indonesian Muslims integrates Hindu Bali into Indonesian society defined in terms of the national ideology Pancasila. The establishment of Pancasila as a hegemonic symbology has led to a new form of parallel pluralism in which all religions are subject to state regulation.
Keywords: *Bali, Hinduism, Islam, Female Saints, Pluralism, State Symbologies*

Abstrak: Makalah ini menggambarkan dua bentuk keragaman beragama masyarakat di Bali. Yang pertama adalah keragaman adaptif di mana unsur-unsur Islam tergabung dalam kerajaan pra-modern Bali. Analisa berfokus pada saat di mana Gusti Ayu Made Rai, seorang puteri kerajaan Bali abad kedelapan belas menjadi Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah, salah seorang wanita Muslim yang dianggap wali di Indonesia. Hal ini mengarah kepada wacana alternatif tentang sejarah agama orang Bali, yang berlawanan dengan pandangan yang meyakini bahwa Bali merupakan tradisi Hindu yang statis secara monolitis. Alih-alih menutup diri saat wilayah-wilayah di sekitarnya memeluk Islam, kerajaan-kerajaan Bali merangkul kaum Muslim dan ajaran Islam dalam kisah-kisah dan kawasan-kawasan sakral. Saat ini strategi integratif tersebut hanya berfungsi di tingkat lokal. Para peziarah Muslim Indonesia ke makam Sang Puteri menyatukan Bali Hindu ke dalam masyarakat Indonesia mempertegas ideologi nasional Pancasila. Pembentukan Pancasila sebagai sebuah simbologi hegemoni telah mengarah kepada bentuk baru keragaman paralel di mana semua agama tunduk kepada peraturan negara.
Kata Kunci: *Bali, Hinduisme, Islam, Wali perempuan, Keberagaman, Simbol-simbol Negara.*

This paper describes two modes of Balinese and Indonesian religious pluralism: Adaptive pluralism in which elements of Islam were incorporated into pre-modern Balinese states. Analysis focuses on the transformation Gusti Ayu Made Rai, an eighteenth-century Hindu Balinese princess into Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah, an Indonesian Muslim saint. Parallel pluralism in which religions are subordinated to the Indonesian state ideology Pancasila. This process involved the transformation of Balinese Hinduism, bringing it into conformity with Pancasila monotheism. Puja Mandala, an inter-faith religious complex in Kuta that is more Indonesian than Balinese.

Religious Pluralism

Pluralism is social and political validation of religious diversity. It takes many forms and is located in many different social and political contexts. At least, it requires recognition of diversity as a social fact.[1] Religious pluralism can be approached from at least two perspectives. One is internal to an abstract variety of religious thought concerning the problem of how moral individuals and just societies based shared behavioural standards but with mutually exclusive metaphysical postulates. A second brackets philosophical considerations and is concerned with managing diversity to avoid communal conflict. Eck refers to this distinction as that between "theological" and "civic" pluralism.[2]

Theological pluralism is commitment to the premise that religions are alternative narratives and symbolic systems speaking to a common truth. It has emerged in socio-political contexts including contemporary secular democracies and Muslim monarchies in 12th century Spain. Examples include Christian theologian John Hicks (1922-2012) and Muslim mystic Ibn al-Arabi (1185-1240).[3] Hicks came to this position pondering the question of how a just God could punish moral people who do not accept the totality of his teachings. His pluralistic hypothesis presumes that all religions are authentic, manifestations of "The Real." Differences, even on fundamental questions concerning the nature of the afterlife, are the consequence of the inability of humans to fully comprehend this reality.[4] Ibn al-Arabi arrived at similar conclusion based on his monistic conception of Allah and the related position that contradictory understandings of reality are emanations from divine reality. Hence his conclusion that Allah can be found in churches, synagogues and temples as easily as in mosques.[5]

There are few instances of states adopting theological pluralism a

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[1] Durkheim defines social facts as: "a category of facts which present very special characteristics: they consist of manners of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him." Durkheim, E., *The Rules of Sociological Method* (New York: Free Press, 1895/1982)

[2] Eck, D., "Prospects for Pluralism: Voice and Vision in the Study of Religion", (Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 2007).

[3] Hick, J., *Christianity and Other Religions: Selected Readings* (London: One World, 2001). Chittick, W., *Ibn al-Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination: The Sufi Path of Knowledge, Albany*", (State University of New York Press, 1989).

[4] Hick, J., *An Interpretation of Religion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989)

[5] Chittick, W., "A Sufi Approach to Religious Diversity: Ibn al-Arabi on the Metaphysics of Revelation", (1991) In: Nasr, S. and Stoddart, W., *Religion of the Heart: Essays Presented to Frithjor Schuon on His Eightieth Birthday* (Washington D.C.: Foundation for Traditional Studies).

strategy for regulating religion.[6] The Mughal emperor Akbar (1542-1605) was a patron of India's many faiths and in 1582 founded *Din i Ilahi* (Divine Faith) combining elements of Hinduism, Islam, Christianity and Zoroastrianism.[7] Akbar's intentions were as much political as religious. The establishment of *Din i Ilahi* was part of a more general strategy to use theological pluralism to guard religious harmony in a multi-religious empire governed by a Muslim minority.[8]

Civic pluralism is not concerned with truth claims. It is the recognition that multiple religious groups are legitimate social and political actors. Civic pluralism allows religious communities to coexist peacefully even while disagreeing on basic religious issues. It can be an effective strategy for managing religion because it does not require people to compromise high level metaphysical assumptions.[9] While theological pluralisms share a common logic, there are many possible civic pluralisms. This paper considers two forms of Balinese civic pluralism: *additive pluralism* that incorporated Islam and Muslims into Hindu-Balinese states and *parallel pluralism* that subordinates Islam to both the religious framework of the Indonesian state and the local dominance of Balinese Hindus.

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[6] Berger, P., "The Political Management of Pluralism", (Society, 2014).

[7] Habib, I., *Akbar and His India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[8] Roy, C., *The Din-i-Ilahi or The Religion of Akbar*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1941).

[9] Conversations I have had with Indonesian Salafis since the 1980s are examples. When asked about working jointly with Christians, a Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) leader replied this this was possible even though Christians were certain to burn in Hell. Another made similar comments about Muslims who engage in religious practices such as visiting graves that many Salafis consider to be unbelief.

Additive civic pluralism is based on the set theoretical concept of intersection. It identifies traits shared by two bounded sets. Public validation of this intersection provides legitimacy. The Balinese Hindu polity identified an intersection with Islam and absorbed it in much the same way that successive western monotheisms (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) absorbed elements of antecedent traditions. Parallel pluralism is a social formation in which two bounded, non-intersecting traditions are incorporated into a larger structure defined by the union of two (or more) sets that are subordinated to a higher order symbolic structure. Both problematize concepts of pluralism rooted in the social sciences and religious studies. The first case demonstrates that the boundary between civic and theological pluralism is not always entirely clear because it builds on limited religious commonalities. The second demonstrates that pluralism is not necessarily rooted in shared religious beliefs.

Balinese Hinduism and Orientalist Romanticism

Bali is often called the "Island of the Gods." Western representations of Bali have been tinged with romantic longing since the days of the Netherlands East India Company.[10] Tropes of Rousseau's "noble savage" and a longing for an other than Muslim Indonesia are the implicit subtexts of much of the academic and popular writing about Balinese religion and culture. Bali is often seen as a Hindu island in a sea of Islam and as a

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[10] Boone, J., *The Anthropological Romance of Bali 1597-1972: Dynamic Perspectives in Marriage and Caste, Politics and Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

fossilized version of what Java used to be. [11] Vickers mentions that the first Dutch mariners to visit Bali were pleased to discover that Balinese, unlike Turkish Muslims, ate pork and unlike Portuguese Roman Catholics, did not fast on Fridays.[12] These cultural similarities led them to conclude (incorrectly) that Balinese kingdoms were natural allies in their struggle against these rivals and Muslim Mataram.[13] Following Raffles' lead, generations of orientalists described the Bali as a refuge from the fall of the Hindu-Javanese kingdom Majapahit to "Goth-like Muslims."[14] Dutch Orientalism constructed an illusionary image of Bali as "Little India" to impede the spread of Islam and the growth of nationalism in the same way that Raffles constructed an image of a less than Islamic Java and Singapore as nothing more than a fishing village to support of his expansionist colonialist policies in the early nineteenth century.[15] Since the 1920's Bali has been depicted as "a utopia where tired Europe could refresh itself and find spiritual harmony."[16] Geertz and others fixed this image in anthropological imagination, depicting Bali as a tranquil, agrarian civilization obsessed with ritual and the performing arts, self-consciously distancing itself from its political and economic environments and the Islamicate civilizations surrounding it.[17] Geertz's description of Balinese kingdoms as "theatre states" replicating the Hindu-Balinese cosmos and more concerned with ritual than *realpolitik* builds on this Orientalist tradition.[18]

Romanticized representations of "exotic" cultures rarely stand up to close scrutiny. Vickers and Andaya have shown that far from being bastions of a besieged Indic civilization, pre-colonial Balinese states were engaged with neighbouring Muslim states. They also supported the development of Muslim communities. Here, I carry this analysis a step further, showing that Muslim themes, symbols and at least one saint, were incorporated into the symbology of Hindu-Balinese kingdoms.

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[11] Geertz, C., *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

[12] The Ottomans, Portuguese, British and Dutch were rivals for control of the Southeast Asian spice trade. On the Ottoman presence in Southeast Asia see: Peacock, A. and Gallop, A., *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks, and Southeast Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Bulut, M., "The Role of the Ottomans and Dutch in the Commercial Integration between the Levant and Atlantic in the Seventeenth Century*,"* Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 2002); Tulips, long iconic of Dutch culture, were originally imported from Ottoman Turkey where they were national symbols. See: Theunissen, H, and Roding, M. (eds.) *The Tulip, A Symbol of Two Nations* (Utrecht: Istanbul Turco-Dutch Friendship Association Press, 1993). The world's greatest spice market was, and still is, in Istanbul.

[13] Vickers, A., "Hinduism and Islam in Indonesia: Bali and the Pasisir World", (Indonesia, 1987).

[14] Raffles, T., *The history of Java* (London: Black, 1917), Parbury, and Allen, Day, A., "Islam and Literature in South-East Asia: Some Pre-Modern, Mainly Javanese Perspectives", (1983); in: Islam in South-Eat Asia, Hooker, M., Leiden: E. J. Brill.

[15] Guermonprez, J., "La Religion Balinaise dans le Miroir de Hindouism", (Bulletin de Ecole Frangaise d'Extreme Orient, 2001). Smith, B. and Woodward, M., *Decolonizing Islam and Feminism*, (2014) in: Smith, B. and Woodward, M., *Gender and Power in Indonesian Islam: Leaders, Feminists, Sufis and Pesantren Selves* (London: Routledge, 2014).

[16] Vickers, A., *Bali: A Paradise Created* (North Clarendon: Tuttle Publishing, 2012).

[17] Geertz, C., "Person Time and Conduct in Bali: An Essay in Cultural Analysis", (American Anthropologist, 1967); Lansing, S., *Three Worlds of Bali,* (New York: Praeger, 1983).

[18] Geertz, C., *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

Theoretical Perspectives

Theoretical myopia is among the challenges confronting analysis of cultural complexity. It often leads to neglect of elements of complexity that cannot be explained by a single theory. Here I rely on struc vturalist theory in the analysis of the spatial orientation of Hindu-Balinese states and performance theory in the analysis of how a Balinese Hindu space is transformed to incorporate Islam. These approaches are united by an overarching complexity theory based model of state systems including three components: 1.) Symbologies: institutionalized meaning systems including narratives, symbols and rituals that establish legitimacy a; 2.) Technologies security forces, education, infrastructure; 3.) Identity spaces that includes face to face and imagined communities that support, contest for, or elude symbologies and technologies.[19]

Sacred Geography and Indianized States

The equation of microcosm and macrocosm in a basic structural principle the "Indianized States" of Southeast Asia.[20] Heine-Geldern scholars following him have taken this cosmic equation as a point of departure for exploring the dynamics of Southeast Asian states.[21] States, palaces and temples were constructed as *mandala*, a central point surrounded by multiples of four at cardinal and directions, replicating Buddhist or Hindu cosmologies. Kings were incarnations of Hindu gods (*Devaraja*) or just kings who rule in accordance with Buddhist teachings (*Dharmaraja*).[22] Tambiah calls these kingdoms "Galactic Polities." They were totalizing institutions in which administrative and other aspects of state technologies and identity spaces are subordinated to and structured in terms of symbologies.[23] Balinese states were exceptional only because of the extent to which this pattern of spatial pervades daily life.[24]

Premodern Southeast Asian states were, however, more than replicas of Indian prototypes. In most instances, Southeast Asian Galactic Polities absorbed elements of non-dominant religions as components of sacred geography and state ceremonies. In Burma, indigenous spirits (*nat*), some believed to be reincarnations of foreign Muslims, figured significantly in sacred geography and popular Buddhist piety.[25] In Burma and Thailand Hindu

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[19] This is a slightly modified version of a model developed by Liu, Fisher-Onar and Woodward. Liu, J., Fisher-Onar, N. and Woodward, M., "Critical junctures? Complexity and the Post-Colonial Nation-state", (International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 2014).

[20] Coedes, G., *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1968).

[21] Heine-Geldern, R., (1930) "Weltbild und Bauform in Südostasien'", (Wener Beitrage zur Kunst- und Kulturgeschichte Asiens, 1930); *Conceptions of Sate and Kingship in Southeast Asia,* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1956).

[22] On *Devaraja* see: Kulke, H., *The Devaraja Cult* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1978); On *Dharmaraja* see: Smith, B., (ed.) *Religion and Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Laos, and Burma*, (Chambersburg: ANIMA, 1978).

[23] Tambiah, S., "The Galactic Polity in Southeast Asia". In *Culture, Thought, and Social Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973); *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

[24] Hauser-Schäublin, B., "The Politics of Sacred Space; Using Conceptual Models of Space for Socio-political Transformations in Bali", (Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 2004).

[25] Brown, G., "The Taungbyon Festival, Burma", (The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and

Brahmins played vital roles in state ceremonies. This still the case in the modern Thai kingdom.[26] The 15th-18th century Arakanese kingdom Mrauk U carried this integrative tendency further than most. While it was primarily Buddhist, Muslim scholars and symbolism were fully incorporated into the royal cult of glory.[27] It should, therefore, come as no surprise that Balinese kingdoms drew on Muslim as well as Hindu sources of legitimacy and provided for the establishment of Muslim shrines and communities, and in so doing, establishing multi-religious Galactic Polities.

Ritual and Social Transformations

Victor Turner is known best for his theories of the transformative power of ritual and social dramas. Rites of passage are rituals that move people from one position to another in well-defined social structures. Social dramas transform societies at critical junctures in social and political history. Critical junctures are points in time where significant reconfiguration of system parameters is possible, necessary and in some cases inevitable. They range for critical points in the lives of important individuals to cataclysmic events such as state failures leading to the reconfiguration of social systems.

Rites of passage mark critical transitions in the life cycle including birth, puberty, marriage and death. Analogous rituals mark entry into structured social groups ranging from the military to social clubs. Turner describes three phases common to most rites of passage: 1.) separation, in which previously existing social roles are dissolved, 2.) a period of liminality marked by the absence of well-defined social roles in which initiates receive instruction, and 3.) reintegration where they assume new social roles.[28] Here I use this model to explain the process through which Gusti Ayu Made Rai became not only a Muslim but also an exemplary Muslim woman and a saint or friend of Allah.

In his analysis of social dramas Turner develops a theory of social transformation based on the performative structure of conflict situations.[29] His model includes four stages: 1.) breach; 2.) crisis; 3.) redress; and 4.) reintegration. He is especially concerned with the third phase which is characterized by reflexivity. Here social actors reconsider the structure of social institutions and consider options for reintegration. Turner's model is incomplete and overly optimistic because it does not allow for the possibility that reflexivity and redress may fail, leading to the renewal of conflict or that the social restructuring it produces will sow the seeds of future conflict. Another less than optimal outcome is that reintegration efforts will become irrelevant because of unforeseeable social or political change. This appears to be the true in the case of Siti Khotijah. The seventeenth century restructuring of the sacred geography and symbology of Badung does not provide an adequate model for maintaining Hindu-Muslim congeniality

Ireland, 1915)**;** Spiro, M., *Burmese Supernaturalism* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967); Woodward, Mark, "When One Wheel Stops: Theravada Buddhism and the British Raj in Upper Burma", (Crossroads, 1988).

[26] Quaritch-Wales, H., *Siamese State Ceremonies: Their History and Function* (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1931).

[27] Gutman, P., "*Symbolism of Kingship in Arakan*," in: Marr, D. and Milner, A. *Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries* (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1986).

[28] Turner, V., *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).

[29] Turner, V., *Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980).

in contemporary Bali.

Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah, the Balinese Galactic Polity, Social Transformation and Additive Pluralism

Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah was a princess from the kingdom of Badung in the Denpasar area. Her tomb is a pilgrimage site for Hindus and Muslims. There are thousands of Muslim holy (*keramat*) graves throughout Indonesia. Pilgrimage (*ziyarah*) to them is an element of traditional Southeast Asian Islam. Some are of only local significance. Others, especially those of the *Wali Songo*, the nine saints instrumental in establishing Islam as the religion of Java, attract millions of pilgrims from throughout Indonesia and neighbouring countries.[30] Women are buried at many of these shrines, most often because they are the wives or daughters of the male saint. Quinn estimates that there are no more than a dozen widely recognized women saints in all of Indonesia.[31] The fact that there is a steady stream of buses bringing pilgrims from Java to Siti Khotijah's tomb indicates that she has become a national phenomenon. Her tomb is located in a walled compound inside a

Hindu cemetery in the Pemecutan district of Denpasar and is known as "*Keramat Agung Pemecutan*" (The Great Holy Place of Pemecutan).

There are several versions of her sacred biography.[32] Here, I rely primarily on one included in a booklet by Mangku I Made Puger and conversations with him. He is the current caretaker (*juru cunci*) of the shrine and distributes the booklet to Muslim and Hindu pilgrims. I supplement these accounts with materials collected from Muslim and Hindu pilgrims themselves.

The section describing Gusti Ayu Made Rai can be analysed as a rite of passage. It begins with a description of her social position as a Balinese Hindu princess and a health crisis that led to her transformation into a Madurese Muslim queen.

Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah was born Gusti Ayu Made Rai or Raden Ayu Pemecutan in the mid-seventeenth century. She was the daughter of the Balinese king of Badung, I Gusti Ngurah Gede Pemecutan, who was also the founder of the modern city of Denpasar. The exact dates of her birth and death are not known.

There are at least two accounts of how she came to be a Muslim. The one most commonly told to Muslim pilgrims visiting her grave and which is included in Mangku I Made Puger's booklet is:

> When she was a young woman, Raden Ayu Pemecutan became

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[30] On the *Wali Songo* see: Sunyoto, Agus., *Atlas Wali Songo: Buku Pertama yang Mengungkap Wali Songo Sebagai Fakta Sejarah* (Depok: Pustaka IIMaN, 2014); Quinn, G., "Throwing Money at the Holy Door", (2007) In: Greg Fealy, G. and White, S., (eds.) *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Rinkes, D., *Nine Saints of Java* (Malaysian Kuala Lumpur: Sociological Research Institute, 1996); Woodward, M., "Jerusalem in Java," In: Adelman, M. and Elman, M., *Jerusalem: Conflict and Cooperation in a Contested City* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994).

[31] Quinn, G., *The Veneration of Female Saints in Indonesia*, in: Joseph, S. *et. al.* (eds.) *Encyclopaedia of Women and Islamic Cultures* (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

[32] I refer to this as a "sacred biography" because it cannot be independently verified. Historians are inclined to dismiss scared biographies as "pious fictions." Regardless of the degree to which they include accurate accounts of the lives of actual individuals, they are enormously important in the lived experience of religion. People who value them do not merely believe them to be true. They know them it be factual. On the concept of sacred biography see: Heffernan, T., *Sacred Biography: Saints and Their Biographers in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

seriously ill with hepatitis. None of the Balinese healers could cure the disease. They tried various traditional medicines including antidotes for poison and efforts to combat sorcery, but none of them were successful.[33] The king went to meditate (*tapa semadi*) at a holy place located inside the palace. He received a *pawisik* (message) that he should hold a competition to see who could cure his daughter. The following day he ordered the prime minister to prepare an announcement of a competition not only for the people of Badung, but also for all of Bali and kingdoms outside Bali. The announcement stated: "Whoever can treat and cure my child: If it is a woman she will be the king's adopted daughter. If it is a man and the two are soul mates they will be married."

This came to the attention of an *ulama/syech* from Yogyakarta. This *ulama* was a person with great mystical knowledge (*ilmu kebatinan*). Pangeran Cakrangingrat IV (1718-1746) of the Madurese kingdom of Bangkalan was his student and close associate.[34] The *syech* sent him a message instructing him to come to Yogyakarta as quickly as possible. After receiving the message from his teacher, Pangeran Cakrangingrat came to Yogyakarta with forty soldiers. When he arrived, the prince appeared before his teacher and asked him what had happened. The *syech* told him what he had received a message from the King of Pemecutan in Bali. He then ordered the prince to go to Bali to meet the king.

Pangeran Cakrangingrat IV said farewell to and asked for blessing (*pamit dan mohon doa restu*) from his teacher before leaving for Bali.

When he arrived at Pemecutan he presented himself to the king, who received him warmly. The prince asked what had happened and how he could help. The king explained that his daughter Gusti Ayu Made Rai had been suffering from hepatitis for several years. He asked if the prince could treat and cure the illness his daughter was suffering from. The prince replied that he would do what the king had asked.[35]

The king summoned his beloved daughter and introduced her to Pangeran Cakrangingrat. From the moment she met him the princess's heart trembled and the treatment began. After several treatments, the illness she had suffered from for years began to be cured. She revealed the feelings of her heart to her father.

The king called Pangeran Cakrangingrat to appear before him and in their meeting thanked him for his help treating and curing his daughter and asked if he had fallen in love with her. Pangeran Cakrangingrat replied that from their first meeting he had been entranced with the princess and that he loved her. Recognizing that their feelings were the same, the two were married in the Pemecutan palace in the presence of the prince's forty bodyguards and the entire royal family of Pemecutan.

Her marriage and journey to Madura with her husband marks the first of the stages, separation, in Turner's model of rites of passage. In this instance, the separation is geographic – out of Bali – and socio-religious – out of Hinduism

The prince then asked permission to return to Bangkalan with his

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[33] Another version of the story does not mention the miraculous healing and states that the king gave Raden Ayu Pemecutan in marriage to the Madurese prince after he provide assistance in a war against a rival kingdom.

[34] The Sultanate of Yogyakarta was not established until 1755.

[35] Vickers (1987) *op. cit.* mentions that in some areas in Bali Muslims are highly regarded as healers. It seems unlikely that a monarch would have undertaken such a journey. The tale is however congruent with Balinese understandings of Muslims as healers. It is reasonable to suggest that the ranks and titles of some of the characters in the story were inflated to enhance its prestige.

wife.

What follows is the second, liminal, phase in which she learns about Islam. This is not described in detail. It is simply stated that:

Gusti Ayu Made Rai became a Muslim and changed her name to Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah.[36]

Her reincorporation and subsequent new position as a proper seventeenth century Muslim woman are described in greater detail.

> After embracing Islam, she became very devoted the *Shari'ah* including praying five times per day. Even though she was Pangeran Cakrangingrat's fourth wife, she lived harmoniously with the others. As a Muslim, she was very devoted to *pengajian* (religious talks) *dakwah* (propagation of Islam) and other religious activities.[37]

Social Drama, Siti Khotijah and the Reconfiguration of Badung's Sacred Geography

Setting the Stage

The next section of the text sets the stage for the social drama leading to the reconfiguration of Badung's symbology. The stage for this social drama is the palace (*puri*) of Badung. The sacred geography of a Balinese palace is based on the *kahyangan tiga* (three temples) system that also structures villages and domestic compounds. It includes three principle shrines: 1.) The household shrine or temple of origin (*pura puseh*) where

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[36] The name chose for her was that of the Prophet Muhammad's first wife Khadijah who is commonly known as the "Mother of the Believers."

[37] Here she is depicted as the ideal traditional Muslim woman. Wives living harmoniously in plural marriages is an ideal that is frequently not a social reality.

purified ancestors are located; 2.) Living quarters (*pura desa*) and 3.) The death temple/cemetery (*pura dalem*). They are structured by a hierarchy of purity, the most impure being the *pura desa* and the purest the *pura puseh*. The *pura desa* occupies an intermediate position.[38] Hobart shows that the life cycle is conceptualized as movement from the *pura puseh* where rites for new-borns a performed, through the *pura desa* where the child comes to adulthood and with death to the *pura dalem*. The *maligia* ritual is performed to purify the souls of the dead, often long after they have been cremated, and return them to the *pura puseh*.

> After living with her husband for many years she finally became homesick for the father, mother and family. She came before her husband to ask his blessing and permission to visit them. Pangeran Cakrangingrat understood her desires very well. Although he had heavy duties and obligations he granted Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah permission to visit her father, mother and family in Pemecutan. He ordered some of his bodyguards and ladies of the court to accompany her on the journey to Bali. Forty of these male and female attendants accompanied Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah on her journey even though Pangeran Cakrangingrat did not. Before Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah left he gave her a ceramic jar, a *keris* (dagger) and several *pusaka* (sacred heirlooms) that she concealed in her hair. Then Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah and her companions left on their journey to Bali.
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> At the time Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah left Bangkalan to visit Bali, the Pemecutan kingdom was preparing for the large *maligia* ritual the purpose of which is to purify the spirits of the dead. This was an auspicious time for her to

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[38] Hauser-Schäublin *op. cit.*

visit and meet with her family. [39] When she and her companions arrived in Pemecutan her family greeted them warmly. Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah slept in the palace (*pura desa*) while her companions stayed in the adjacent courtyard.

The Breach

A breach, the first stage in Turner' model of social drams, occurs because there is no place for Muslim piety in the confines of Hindu-Balinese sacred space. Siti Khotijah's attempt to appropriate the Badung *pura puseh* for Muslim purposes leads to the illusion of a symbolic reversal in which Muslim piety is (mis) understood as Balinese sorcery.[40]

Because she had become a Muslim, when the time for the evening prayer (*maghrib*) came, she prayed in the sacred place (*pura puseh*) inside the palace. She prayed wearing a white *mukena* (women's prayer garment) facing west in the direction of the *kiblat* (Mecca). The prime minister saw her praying without a prayer rug. What he saw surprised him because very few people in Bali had ever seen a Muslim pray. The prime minister thought that she was practicing black magic (*ilmu hitam/ngeleak*).[41]

The Crisis

A crisis, the second stage in Turner's model, ensues when Siti Khotijah's breach of Hindu Balinese custom and intrusion of Muslim ritual into Hindu space is discovered. Her father responds in a violent manner, though one appropriate given the religious assumptions on which Balinese concepts of sacred space are based.

> The prime minister reported what he had seen to the king. After he received the report and then saw her praying himself, the king was very angry. Without asking Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah what she was doing, he ordered the prime minister to take her to the graveyard (*pura dalem*) together with the bodyguards and the female companions who had come with her from Bangkalan.

Redress and Reflexivity

The critical redress/reflexivity stage commences when she responds to her father's accusations and acquiesces to his verdict.

When they arrived at the graveyard, Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah addressed the prime minister.

> My uncle the prime minister, I have the feeling, I already know, that I have been brought here to be killed. Because this is my father's order as the king and authority, please, uncle prime minister, carry out his order.
>
> Know uncle prime minister that I was praying in the holy place according the practice of the

[39] See: Wiener, M., *Visible and Invisible Realms: Power, Magic and Colonial Conquest in Bali* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[40] On symbolic reversal and witchcraft see: Babcock, B., (ed.) *The Reversible World: Symbolic Inversion in Art and Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978) On witchcraft and symbolic reversals see: Ginzburg, G. *The Night Battles: Witches and Agrarian Cults in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

[41] Balinese believe than many physical and mental illnesses are caused by witchcraft. Intense fear of witches (*leyak*) is common in all social strata. Conflict between Rangda, the queen of the *leyak*, and Barong, a lion spirit, is a common theme in Balinese literary and performance traditions. Stephen, M., "Witchcraft, Grief, and the Ambivalence of Emotions", (American Ethnologist, 1999); Mead, M. and Bateson, G., *Trance and Dance in Bali* (Washington DC: United States Library of Congress, 1951). Rangda is usually depicted as a woman very long flowing white hair that could be confused with a *mukena*. A *leyak* practicing black magic in the *pura puseh* is a symbolic reversal that Balinese might well find horrifying.

religion that I believe in, Islam. I was fulfilling the ritual requirements of my religion.
This was her message to the prime minister:
Do not kill me with a sharp weapon because I cannot be killed in that way. Instead use my hairpin. It has been wrapped in a betel leaf decorated with the colours of the *Tri Datu* -- black, white and red. (This symbolizes the three Hindu gods: Brahma, Visnu and Siva.)[42]
Stick it in the left side of my chest. After I am dead, smoke will come out from my body. If it smells bad, please uncle prime minister, just bury me. But if the smoke that comes out of my body smells sweet, please build me a holy place to be known as *keramat*.
After Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah said this and had conveyed her message to the prime minister she gave the hair pin to him. She raised her hands in *sembah* (both hands held together in front of the face) to Allah. She asked the prime minister to stab the left side of her chest with the hairpin.

This indicates that Siti Khotijah understood that the incompatibility of Muslim piety and Hindu sacred geography. She accepts death but in so doing proposes restructuring the Badung galactic polity.[43]

Then, the prime minister stabbed her in the left side of the chest with the hairpin. She fell down, breathing her last breath. Very sweet smoke smelling like honey and Arabian incense came from her body and filled the entire Badung graveyard that is eleven hectares in size so that it smelled very sweet.[44]

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[42] This is the only reference to Hindu concepts in the text.

[43] This type of confusion would not have happened in Klungkung because there is a mosque located inside the palace.

[44] An alternative version of the story is that she was stabbed in the back with a spear.

This passage shows that Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah has become not just a Muslim, but also a saint. She did not fear, and indeed embraced, death and had at least limited powers of invulnerability. This is in keeping with Javanese and Madurese traditions concerning the invulnerability of saints and the teachings of many Sufi masters who understood death as a step on the journey to Allah. Schimmel quotes the ninth century woman saint Rabia al Adawiyya in her comments on Sufi understandings of death.

Rabia taught that the believers should love God not from hope or fear but for the sake of his own eternal beauty: out of pure love. "The lovers of God no longer dreaded death but rather longed for it, for death is a bridge that leads the lover to the beloved."[45]

The idea that the bodies of saints are fragrant, smelling of flowers and incense is also deeply rooted in Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian Sufism.[46] It is often said that the bodies of Muslim saints smell of flowers and incense a belief that can be traced to Prophetic traditions about the fragrance of the Prophet Muhammad.[47] Javanese Sufi texts and tradition also mention the limited invulnerability of the fifteenth century saintly martyr Syech Siti Jenar and sweet smell of his corpse.[48] The

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[45] Schimmel, A., *Rumi's World: The Life and Work of the Great Sufi Poet* (Boulder: Shambhala Publications, 2001).

[46] Asher, B., "The Sufi Shrines of Shahul Hamid in India and Southeast Asia", (Artibus Asie, 2009).

[47] Thurlkill, M., *Sacred Scents in Early Christianity and Islam* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 2016).

[48] Syech Siti Jenar is sometimes considered to have been one of the *Wali Songo.* He was executed for openly proclaiming the mystical truth of Ibn al-Arabi's teaching of *waḥdat al*-wujūd, the unity of the divine essence and the human soul, Hadisuwarno, S., *Biografi Lengkap Syekh Siti Jenar* (Yogyakarta: Laksana, 2018). In this respect, Siti Jenar resembles

smell of incense (*menyan*) and flowers is associated with purity and holiness. Pilgrims visiting holy graves often burn it. This would also appear to connect the story of Raden Ayu Siti Khadija's death with the Balinese Hindu *maligia* ritual. There is, however, a stark contrast between the fragrance of her body (purity) and the foul smell of Balinese cemeteries that are used as cremation grounds (impurity).[49] However, Siti Khatija's spirit does not require purification because she has become a saint and has been purified in life in ways that are not possible in Balinese Hinduism.

Reintegration

Reintegration, the final stage in Turner's model, involves the construction of purified Muslim space within the defile space of the Hindu *pura dalem*. It transforms Badung symbology by creating a Muslim enclave in the Hindu-Balinese Galactic Polity. It also redefines the identity space of the Balinese kingdom through the creation of formally recognized Muslim residential spaces.

Some of the people who accompanied her cried hysterically and others fainted. Later that evening Muslim funeral prayers were held and her body was buried. When this was finished the prime minister and Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah's companions presented themselves to the king of Pemecutan. The prime minister

conveyed Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah's words and the message she gave before she died to the king.

The king appointed a juru *kunci* (care taker) for her grave and ordered that he and his descendants should care for it.

The man chosen for these tasks was a Hindu. The current care taker, Mangku I Made Puger, is the grandson of the first *juru kunci.* Like his father and grandfather, he is a Hindu. He takes his responsibility to care for the grave and meet the needs of Muslim pilgrims very seriously. He explained that he travelled to East Java to "learn how to care for Muslim graves." Put in theoretical terms he learned the modes of ritual practice appropriate for Muslim sacred space.

The bodyguards and female attendants did not return to Bangkalan in Madura. They were given land to settle on in the area that is now Kampung Jawa in North Denpasar and Kampung Islam Kepaon in South Denpasar.[50]

The day after she died, Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah's grave was cleaned and the new *juru kunci* and his wife covered it with the flowers used at Javanese and Madurese Muslim graves. That night there was an unexpected miracle. A tree approximately fifty centimetres tall grew from Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah's grave. The next morning the *juru kunci* and his wife cut it down, but it grew back the next night at the same size and in the same place. This happened three times. They were not brave enough to cut the tree that grew from Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah's grave again. That night the *juru kunci* and his wife meditated

Mansur al-Hallaj, the Persian Sufi executed in Baghdad in 922. There is not, however, a direct historical connection between them, Feener, M., "A Re-examination of the Place of al-Hallaj in the Development of Southeast Asian Islam", (Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 1998).
[49] Balinese bury their dead until they have sufficient resources to cremate them. When a wealthy and powerful person is cremated, the bodies of relatives and retainers are often cremated with him/her.

[50] Muslims from Java, Sulawesi and other parts of Indonesia have settled in these *kampung.* Islam and Muslims were integrated into the sacred space of Klungkung is a more systematic way. There, the palace is surrounded by concentric circles of alternating Hindu and Muslim villages.

(*terakat/ bersemedi*) at the grave. While meditating they heard Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah's voice and received a message from her.

She said that the tree that had grown from the middle of her grave should be cared for because it had grown from her hair and that Allah would grant miracles (*mukjizat*) and blessing (*rejeki*) to his communities (*umat*) that perform pilgrimage (*berziyarah*) to her grave. Because of this message the tree has be honoured and well cared for. It is now known as the *Pohon Rambut* (Hair Tree).

The tree is approximately 16 meters tall. Like Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah's grave, it is sacred (*keramat*). It is said that its leaves never fall on the grave and that they have medicinal properties. Mangku I Made Puger collects them and gives them to Hindu and Muslim pilgrims.

The Grave Complex: Containing Muslim Space

The grave complex is located within the Badung *pura dalem.* Like other Balinese cemeteries it is overgrown with tree and brush and has the appearance of being abandoned. In contrast, the compound including Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah's grave is carefully maintained. The grave complex includes two walled compounds.

The outer compound is liminal space. It is a passage way from the defiled Balinese Hindu space of the *pura dalem* to the purified grave site that can be understood as a distinctively Muslim *pura puseh*. This entryway is mixed Hindu-Muslim space. There are signs indicating that it is the entry to Siti Khotijah's grave, but it is a site for Hindu or at least Hindu style devotions. There are statues of Hindu guardian spirits. Daily offerings (*canang* sari) made to them are distinctively Balinese. They do not resemble those typically presented to spirits in Java (*sajen*).

The inner compound and the gate leading to it are Muslim space. They are almost indistinguishable from Muslim graves in Java, Madura, elsewhere in Indonesia and those in Muslim societies in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. The only distinctive feature of Siti Khotijah's grave is the "hair tree" that has grown through the roof of the enclosure. Ritual practices associated with *ziyarah* to the grave are entirely conventional, including *tahlil* -- rhythmic recitation of the first phrase of the Muslim Confession of Faith (*shahada*) *La ilaha illa Lah* (There is no god but God) reciting or reading *Surah Yasin* of the Qur'an and *do'a* (supplications asking Allah for assistance), burning incense and scattering red and white flowers on the tomb.[51] Only Muslim pilgrims engage in these practices. Hindu pilgrims pay their respects with a *sembah*. There is no apparent blending of devotional practices as there are at some Hindu-Muslim shrines in India.[52] Hindus visit an unambiguously Muslim shrine primarily because of its healing powers.

Contemporary Pilgrimage Practices

In the eighteenth-century narratives concerning Siti Khotijah and incorporation of her grave into the Badung Galactic polity were local, or at most regional, Balinese phenomena. Colonialism, post-colonial nation building and internal migration have transformed Balinese identity spaces.

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[51] The practices are remarkably uniform across otherwise vastly different Muslim cultures. I have observed them throughout Southeast Asia, in Niger and Nigeria in West Africa and in the United Kingdom.

[52] Gold, D., "The Sufi Shrines of Gwalior City: Communal Sensibilities and the Accessible Exotic under Hindu Rule", (The Journal of Asian Studies, 2005).

Bali is far less culturally and political autonomous than it was in the eighteenth century. At least fifteen percent of the population is now Muslim. In Denpasar, some estimates place it as high as twenty-five percent. Economic opportunity resulting from the development of Bali as global tourist destination sparked a wave of Muslim immigration from East Java, Lombok and Madura beginning in the mid-1980s. This has led to the nationalization of pilgrimage to Siti Khotijah's grave and the development of a Bali based Muslim pilgrimage network.

Muslim and Hindu Balinese visit Siti Khotijah's shrine individually or in small groups. These pilgrimages are especially common during Ramadan. Larger groups of Balinese Muslims and others from Java, Lombok, Madura and Sulawesi come to celebrate her birthday. These commemorations include a large *slametan* (prayer meal) similar to those held in Java. Objects that belonged to Raden Ayu Siti Khotijah including her prayer rug, sandals, and other personal items that are said to be charged with *barakah* (blessing) are displayed on these occasions.[53] The date of these celebrations is fixed by the Balinese *Pakuwon* calendar and occurs every 210 days.

There are larger organized pilgrimage tours from Java and Sulawesi. Muslim religious leaders organize some of these. Java based travel agencies specializing in pilgrimage tourism organize others. The Balinese provincial government actively encourages Muslim pilgrimage as part of

its tourism promotion efforts. As many as twenty of these tours, each of which includes as many as two hundred pilgrims/tourists, visit the shrine every week. Many of these tours also visit other Muslim holy sites in Bali, especially the graves of the *Wali Pitu* (seven saints) who are said to have been influential in spreading Islam in Bali. Internationally renowned Muslim leaders including Syech Hisham Kabbani of the transnational Naqshbandi Haqqani Sufi order have also visited the shrine.[54] As many as twenty of these tours, each of which includes as many as two hundred pilgrims/tourists, visit the shrine every week. Many of these tours also visit other Muslim holy sites in Bali, especially the graves of the Seven Wali who were influential in bringing Islam to Bali.

Pilgrimage to the graves of the *Wali Pitu* emerged in the 1990s. These saints were discovered and promoted by Toyib Zain Zaen Arif, an Indonesian Muslim of Hadhrami Arab descent from East Java.[55] His program had as much to do with bringing Bali into Javanese and Hadhrami Islamic identity spaces as with bringing Islam into Balinese identity space.[56] The *Wali Pitu* are modelled on the Javanese *Wali Songo*

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[53] The practice of displaying items belonging to the saint is common throughout the Muslim world. Swords and other items belonging to the Prophet Muhammad and his companions are on display at the Topkapi palace in Istanbul. Jalaluddin Rumi's caps and sandals are displayed at his shrine in Konya.

[54] Syech Hisham Kabbani has large followings in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. He visits Southeast Asia on a regular basis.

[55] Slama, M., *From Wali Songo to Wali Pitu: The Traveling of Islamic Saint Veneration to Bali* (2014) in: Hauser-Schäublin, B. and Harnish, D., *Between Harmony and Discrimination: Negotiating Identities within Majority-Minority Relationships in Bali and Lombok* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

[56] On Hadhrami Islam in Indonesia see: Alatas, F., *Hadhramaut and the Hadhrami Diaspora: Problems in Theoretical History* (1997) in: Freitag, W., *Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statemen in the Indian Ocean 1750s-1960s* (Leiden: Brill, 1997); and Woodward, M., Rohmaniyah, I., Amin, A., Ma'arif, S., Murtaugh Coleman, D. and Umar, S., *Indonesian Affairs,* (2013).

(nine saints), most of whom are believed to have been of Hadhrami descent, who were instrumental in establishing Islam as the religion of Java. Unlike Siti Khotijah, the *Wali Pitu* do not have roots in Balinese history and tradition and are more closely associated with Javanese tradition. All but one is said to have been Hahdramis. The seventh is said to have been an Indonesian Muslim of Chinese descent.

Contemporary Bali, Indonesian State Symbology and Parallel Pluralism

The additive transformation of the Badung Galactic Polity to include Muslim space incorporated a Muslim minority into Hindu society. It required transforming symbologies and technologies that legitimize identity spaces characterized by ethnic and/or religious diversity. Constructing Muslim space within the Badung Galactic Polity served this purpose. The integration of Hindu and Muslim sacred space and pilgrimage approaches what Eck calls theological pluralism. In the case of Siti Khotijah these truth claims are limited to belief in the healing power of her grave. It is important to note that the story of her death could have been, but was not, frame as a martyrdom narrative. She is instead depicted as a Muslim saint whose spiritual powers benefit Hindus as well as Muslims. This establishes the possibility of parallel pluralism. Framing it as a martyrdom story would define Hindu-Muslim relations in conflictual terms.[57]

Some Balinese Hindus think that greater recognition of Siti Khotijah

could promote tolerance and pluralism in modern Bali. A local government website from Sukolilo Baru where her grave is located states:[58]

> The sacred grave at Pemecutan is a Muslim grave located in the middle of a Hindu cemetery in Pemecutan in Denpasar. This grave is that of a descendant of the king of Pemecutan. It is holy for both Hindus and Muslims. This grave is also a symbol of how communities with different religious beliefs can be united. Neither Hindus nor Muslims claim exclusive understandings. They are like two colours brought together in one pot. The situation at the grave of Siti Khotijah is a tool for unifying Muslims with Hindus, who are the majority religion on the island of Bali.

This is perhaps an overly optimistic assessment. It is likely to be the case for Balinese Hindu devotees, but evidence suggests that a provincial level a form parallel civic pluralism located within national level Indonesian identity space and symbology supersedes locally defined additive civic pluralism.

Indonesian Parallel Pluralism as State Symbology

Indonesia was first imagined, in Anderson's sense of the term, and subsequently constructed as a successor state to the Netherlands Indies.[59] It's territorial boundaries and identity space were imagined by Dutch educated intellectuals in the early twentieth

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[57] Healing can provide an entry point for parallel pluralism even in areas with histories of violent conflict. In the neighboring Lombok, where there is a history of conflict between Balinese Hindus and indigenous Sasak Muslims Hindus regularly visit Muslim shrines known for healing powers.

[58] https://kimbaharisukolilobaru.blogspot.com/2018/03/makam-raden-ayu-pemecutan-atau-raden.html

[59] Anderson, B., *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983*)*; Kahin, G., *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952)

century. They were explicitly articulated at the 1928 Youth Conference at which delegates from Ambon, Java, Sulawesi and Sumatra, pledged to put aside ethic and religious differences and recognize one motherland and one nation and Indonesian as the language of national unity.[60]

Questions concerning the place of religion, and especially Islam, in the emerging Indonesian symbology were debated throughout the remainder of the colonial era. Muslim nationalists, among whom Mohamed Natsir (1908-1993) was the most influential were in favour of an explicitly Islamic state while secular nationalists including Indonesia's first president Soekarno (1901-1970, president 1945-1967) advocated the formal separation of religion and the state. A debate between Natsir and Soekarno in the pages of *Pandji Islam* and other Islamic and Nationalist periodicals was emblematic of a larger political conflict about what symbology would dominate the newly imagined nation. [61]

These debates were resolved, tentatively as it turned out, only shortly before the proclamation of independence on August 17th 1945 with the establishment of *Pancasila* as the basic nationalist principle and strategy for managing diversity. Indonesia emerged as religious state without an official religion. Indonesian state symbology is based on *Pancasila* (Five Principles) formulated by the country's first president Soekarno on the eve of Independence[62] It was intended to bring a measure of unity to a vast, diverse ethnoreligious identity space. As Madjid observes, the five principles: 1.) *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (Devotion to the all-powerful God), 2.) *Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab* (Just, well-mannered humanism), 3.) *Persatuan Indonesia* (Indonesian unity), 4.) *Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan* (Populism/democracy with wise leadership assisted by consultation [with the people] and 5.) *Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia* (Social justice for all of the Indonesian people) are deconfessionalized versions of common Islamic principles including the unity of God (*tawhid*) and justice (*adl*).[63]). The first principle originally included

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[60] Foulcher, K., "Sumpah Pemuda: The Making and Meaning of a Symbol of Indonesian Nationhood", (Asian Studies Review, 2000).

[61] Nurdin, A., "Revisiting Discourse on Islam and State Relations in Indonesia: The Views of Soekarno, Natsir and Nurcholish Madjid", (Journal of Indonesian Islam, 2016) As Effendy notes this does not suggest that Soekarno and other secular nationalists were any less committed to Islam than Natsir and his compatriots, but rather that they felt that there is a critical distinction between religion and politics. Soekarno's position was that Islam could only flourish as a religion if it was free from political interference and manipulation. Natsir, was among the most influential leasers of Islamic political party Masyumi until Soekarno banned it in 1960 and later founded the Islamist organization *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, held that Islam is a totalistic way of life and that, as such, *it is necessarily political.* Effendy, B., *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); On Soekarno and his political and religious views see: Legge, J. *Sukarno: A Political*

Biography (London: Allen Lane, 1972); and Soekarno and Soekarno., *Under the Banner of Revolution* (Jakarta: Publication Committee, 1966); On Natsir and his political and religious views see: Kahin, A., *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy: A Political Biography of Mohammad Natsir* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2012); and Burns, P., *Revelation and Revolution: Natsir and the Panca Sila* (Cairns: Committee of South-East Asian Studies, James Cook University, 1981).

[62] Boland, B., *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).

[63] Madjid, N., (1996) *op. cit.* There have been many translations of the wording of the *Pancasila* principles. I have chosen to remain as close as possible to the Indonesian original.

what has come to be known as the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) that states: "with the obligation for Muslims to abide by the *Shari'ah*." This would have established Indonesia as a quasi-Islamic state. It was deleted to secure the agreement of Christian minorities. [64] The primacy of Muslim inspired monotheism would require the reformulation of Buddhism, Hinduism, and most recently indigenous religions, in monotheistic terms to bring them under the *Pancasila* umbrella. This was seemingly not an important consideration in 1945 because the Japanese appointed *Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (Body for the Study of Activities leading towards Indonesian Independence) was composed of Christians and Muslims.

Pancasila is often described as an ideology, but as Morfit notes, it lacks the specificity characteristic of political ideologies.[65] Precisely because of its ambiguity, it can be described more accurately as a symbology. It has been the subject of diverse interpretations and often intense debate and has been a source of both unity and discord.[66] The primacy of *Pancasila* is a constant in Indonesian political thought and symbology that has legitimized regimes with radically different agendas. It is also used as a symbol of real life pluralism. Families resulting from religiously mixed marriages of refer to themselves as *Pancasila* families. Attempts to Islamicize it by reinstating the Jakarta Charter have failed

consistently.[67] In 2018 the Islamist group Hizbul Tahrir Indonesia was banned for advocating abandoning *Pancasila* and establishing a Caliphate. Muslim organizations including Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and the semi-official Majelis Ulama Indonesia supported this move. None consider HTI to be theologically deviant, and as such subject to Indonesia's blasphemy law, but find its opposition to Pancasila to be unacceptable.[68]

As formulated *Pancasila* was vague enough to allow for diverse interpretations. Soekarno stressed the third principle, national unity, and wanted it to be the first. He was vague about the other *sila* because national unity and identity were his priorities. His goal was to make unity out of diversity.

Soekarno spoke of *Pancasila* in a prophetic, utopian mode characteristic of revitalization movements. In emotionally charged speeches including "The Birth of *Pancasila*" he claimed not to have invented *Pancasila*, but to have discovered it, looking into the collective soul of the Indonesian people.[69] He

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[64] Al-Hamdi, R., "The Jakarta Charter in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Political Thoughts of the Elites in Muhammadiyah", (Masyarakat Indonesia, 2015).

[65] Morfit, M., "Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government", (Asian Survey, 1981).

[66] Vatikiotis, M., *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order* (London: Routledge, 2013).

[67] Elson, R., "Another Look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy of 1945", (Indonesia, 2009).

[68] NU Online, "*HTI Tidak Sesat, Tapi Tidak Tepat di Indonesia*", https://www.google.co.id/search?q=hti+sesat&oq=HTI&aqs=chrome.1.69i59l2j69i60j0l3.5653j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 (2018); Tribune News Bogor (2017) "*HTI Dibubarkabn, Ini Kata Ketua Umum Muhammadiyah*", http://bogor.tribunnews.com/2017/05/08/hti-dibubarkan-ini-kata-ketua-umum-muhammadiyah (2018); Kompas.com, "*Menurut MUI, Ideologi dan Aktivitas HTI Bertentangan dengan Pancasila*," https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/07/21/05100001/menurut-mui-ideologi-dan-aktivitas-hti-bertentangan-dengan-pancasila (2018).

[69] Steenbrink, K., "Pancasila as an Ambiguous Instrument for Interreligious Harmony and Development in Indonesia, 1945-2015", (Nagoya: Bulletin of the Nazan Center for

claimed that *Pancasila* was his gift to the Indonesian people. Religion was his gift to the Communists who rejected it. Marxism was his gift to the Muslim community who feared it.

He often invoked the image of the *ratu adil* (just king) who, according to Javanese prophecies, would establish justice and prosperity after a time of chaos and oppression.[70] He was an avid fan of the Javanese *wayang* (shadow play) and saw himself as Gatokaca, the protagonist in a cosmic war pitting good against evil.[71] Gatokaca is a popular warrior character known for great strength and magical powers. Unlike other *wayang* characters he is somewhat coarse (*kasar*) making him an ideal populist warrior hero which fitted with Soekarno's presentation of self.

In the Birth of *Pancasila,* he spoke of a parallel pluralism that fell short of Indonesia's diversity:

> Not only should the people of Indonesia have belief in God, but every Indonesian should believe in his own particular God. The Christian should worship God according to the teachings of Jesus Christ; Muslims according to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad; Buddhists should discharge their religious rites according to their own books. But let us all have believe in God. The Indonesian state shall be a state where every person can worship God in freedom … without 'religious egoism'. And the State of Indonesia should be a State incorporating the belief in God. Let us observe, let us practice religion, whether Islam or Christianity, in a civilised way … the way of mutual respect.[72]

Sperber shows that symbolism evokes rather than transmits meaning.[73] It also evokes emotion. An ambiguously structured symbology allows for a greater range of evocations that promotes social inclusivity. This was especially important for the first and fifth *Pancasila* principles, belief in God and social justice. The first principle was so vague that Christians and Muslims could identify with it. Buddhism and Hinduism did not fit as well and required creative theology to make them monotheistic. Social justice was so vaguely stated it could unite Communists, Liberal Democrats, Christian and Muslim religious groups monarchists. Appeals to the spirit of revolutionary struggle moved people of different religious and political orientations to disregard difference and unite in a common cause.

This vague, evocative symbology was less suited to the tasks of nation building regulating political competition.[74] In the post-revolutionary period Soekarno's ideological and symbolic creativity were incapable of meeting Indonesia's political and

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Asia-Pacific Studies, 2015).

[70] Friend, T., *Indonesian Destinies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Dahm, B. *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); Revitalization movements predicting the imminent arrival of a *ratu adil* were common in the colonial era and have continued to emerge in post-colonial Indonesia. Van der Kroef, "The Messiah in Indonesia and Melanesia", (Scientific Monthly, 1952); Kartodirdjo, S., *The Peasants Revolt in Banten in 1888: A Case of Social Movements in Indonesia* (The Hague: KTLV, 1966); Woodward, M., *The Javanese Dukun: Healing and Moral Ambiguity,* in: *Java, Indonesia and Islam* (Springer: New York, 2011).

[71] *Wayang* plays are Islamicized versions of the Sanskrit *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana* epics. Anderson observes th*wayang* characters figure significantly in metaphoric forms of Javanese and Indonesian political discourse. They are so well known that many Javanese instantly recognize personality traits associated with them. See: Anderson, B., *Mythology and Tolerance of the Javanese.*

[72] Friend, *op.cit.*

[73] Sperber, D., *Rethinking Symbolism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

[74] Feith, H., *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964).

economic challenges. Increasingly complex symbologies such as *Nasakom* in which he attempted to bring nationalism, religion and communism combined with the personalist rule of Guided Democracy were not up to the tasks at hand.[75]

Soekarno's symbology collapsed in the wake of a failed coupe on September 30, 1965 that led to spasms of religion and class based violence in which hundreds of thousands were killed. The outcome was establishment of the authoritarian, military backed New Order regime of Indonesia's second president Suharto which was to last until 1998.[76] Suharto was as dedicated to *Pancasila* as his predecessor, but understood it very differently. His New Order (1966-1998) was an authoritarian, managerial regime that did not brook dissent or ideological debate. It was single-mindedly focused on economic development and "rest and order" policies similar to those of the Dutch colonial era. It relied on state technologies including brute force rather than symbology and charisma to buttress the third and fourth *Pancasila* principles: national unity and wise leadership. [77] For Suharto, consultation meant efforts to forge elite consensus rather than participatory democracy. Elections were celebrated as "festivals of democracy" and were more festive than democratic.

Implementing *Pancasila*, Suharto operated in a priestly mode. The New Order developed an authorative interpretation of *Pancasila.* In 1978, it introduced the P-4 (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila*) program that required civil servants, religious leaders and others to attend courses on official interpretations of *Pancasila*.[78] No matter how it is interpreted, *Pancasila* symbology affirms parallel civic pluralism linking bounded religious traditions. The constitution and subsequent legislation require that every citizen profession one of six religions: Islam, Protestant and Roman Catholic Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. The official definition of religion applies an Islamic understanding of monotheism to other religions, especially Buddhism, Indigenous Religions and Hinduism, to which it is not well suited because it requires that every religion be monotheistic and recognize a prophet and a holy book.[79] Official recognition is important because without it, people

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[75] On Guided Democracy see: Feith, H. and Castles, L., *Indonesian political thinking 1945-1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970); and Lev, D., *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966).

[76] Robinson, G., *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).

[77] Weatherbee, D., "Indonesia in 1984: *Pancasila,* Politics, and Power", (Asian Survey, 1985).

[78] Mofit, M., "Pancasila, The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government", (Asian Survey, 1981).

[79] Woodward, M., "Textual Exegesis as Social Commentary: Religious, Social and Political Meanings of Indonesian Translations of Arabic Hadith Texts", (The Journal of Asian Studies, 1993); Madjid, N., *The Search of the Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism: The Indonesian Experiences* (1998) In: Woodward, M., *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought* (Tempe AZ: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series, 1996); *Java, Indonesia and Islam*, New York: Springer, 2011); Brown, I., "Contemporary Indonesian Buddhism and Monotheism", (Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987)*,* Abalahin, A., *A Sixth Religion? Confucianism and the Negotiation of Indonesian-Chinese Identity under the Pancasila State* (2005) In: Willford, A. and George, K., (Eds.) *Spirited Politics: Religion and Public Life in Contemporary Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Cornel University Press).

cannot obtain national identification cards, register marriages, obtain passports, bury their dead in public cemeteries or enrol their children in public schools.

Indonesia has used increasingly powerful and efficient state technologies define Balinese religion in ways that would have hardly been recognizable in the seventeenth century. There has been a shift from ritual to textuality and a move from polytheism towards monotheism.[80] This transformative effort has been so successful that many Balinese now believe that Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa, the term used for "God" is an indigenous concept. In fact, it was invented by Christian missionaries. Balinese intellectuals adapted it in the 1950s to align their traditions with Indonesia's monotheistic state symbology.[81] There is now also considerable tension between factions stressing Balinese Hinduism as a variant of a "universal" Hinduism rooted in South Asian traditions and others promoting a return to "authentic" Balinese tradition.[82] Universalists have

incorporated South Asian Sanskrit texts including the Vedas into their version of Balinese Hinduism and reduced the importance of household and temple rituals. This shift to bounded textuality limits pluralism. Parallel civic pluralism is maintained by the deployment of integrative and potentially coercive state technologies. The hardening of confessional boundaries makes additive pluralism difficult, if not impossible, to establish or maintain.

Post-New Order Decentralization and the Emergence of Provincial Symbologies

Decentralization policies put in place following the 1998 democratic transition have led to the establishment of religiously and culturally exclusivist provincial and local level symbologies throughout Indonesia.[83] In some Muslim majority areas including Aceh, South Sulawesi and West Java *Perda Shari'ah* (Regional *Shari'ah* Regulations) have been used to reinforce Muslim identities. These regulations, such as those put in force in South Sulawesi, requiring Muslim couples to be able to read the *Qur'an* prior to marriage, and in West Java requiring civil servants to wear "Muslim" clothing on Fridays, have little to do with *Shari'ah,* but have become elements of provincial symbologies.[84] An Acehnese *Shari'ah*

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[80] McDaniel, J., "Agama Hindu Dharma Indonesia as a New Religious Movement: Hinduism Recreated in the Image of Islam", (Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, 2005)., In 2017 the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled that the government must recognize indigenous religions. The ruling remains controversial and implementing regulations have not yet been formulated. Maarif, S., *Pasang Surut Rekognisi Agama Leluhur dalam Politik Agama di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: CRCS, 2017); The Baha'i faith was recognized as a religion in 2014; Nurish, A., "Welcoming Baha'i: New official religion in Indonesia", (Jakarta Post, August 8, 2014).

[81] Bakker, F., "Balinese Hinduism and the Indonesian State: Recent Developments", (Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 1997).

[82] Picard, M., *From Agama Hindu Bali to Agama Hindu and Back: Towards a Relocation of the Balinese Religion* (2011) In: Picard, M. and Madinie, R., (eds.) *The Politics of Religion in*

Indonesia. Syncretism, Orthodoxy and Religious Contention in Java and Bali (London: Routledge).

[83] On decentralization see: Bell, G., "The New Indonesian Laws Relating to Regional Autonomy: Good Intentions, Confusing Laws", (Asian Pacific Law and Policy Journal, 2001); and Holzappel, C. and Ramstedt, M., (eds) *Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: Implementation and Challenges* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008).

[84] On *Perda Shari'ah* see: Bush, R., *Regional "Sharia" Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?* (2008) In: Fealy, G & White, S., (eds.) *Expressing Islam: Religious life*

specialist trained at al-Azhar University in Cairo I spoke with in 2010 put it this way: "We had great hopes for *Shari'ah*, but in Aceh today, *Shariah* is about nothing more than women's clothing."

Increasingly strict enforcement of Bali's Day of Silence (*Nyepi*), observed for twenty-four hours on the eve of the Balinese New Year, serves similar purposes. Work, travel and entertainment are forbidden. These were traditionally voluntary religious observances but are now required and enforced by the provincial government. Muslim prayers are exempt from these restrictions in recognition of the need to maintain civic pluralism.

The construction of provincial mosques also contributes to Muslim provincial symbolies. Some of these, including the one in West Sumatra, are based on local architectural tradition and ethnic symbolism. Others are notable only for their size. There have been similar developments in Bali and in Christian majority areas including Manado in North Sulawesi where an enormous statue of Jesus dominates the city's skyline.[85] An enormous (120 meter) statue of the Hindu God Visnu seated on a Garuda (mythological bird and Vishnu's mount in Balinese and South Asian Hinduism) located near the international airport was completed in August 2018. It is named Garuda Wisnu Kencana (Golden Garuda Visnu) and abbreviated GWK. The Indonesian Ministry of Tourism describes it as "an icon of the paradisiacal island of Bali,

but its Garuda also symbolizes Indonesia's national unity in its multiple diversity."[86] *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity) is the Indonesian national motto. A Garuda adorned with a shield with symbols representing the five principles of *Pancasila* is the national emblem. GWK is a multivocal symbol of local Hindu hegemony and national unity.

In Bali Muslims are subordinated in the same ways that non-Muslims are in some Muslim majority areas. The subordination of Balinese Muslims is apparent in difficulties they have securing permission to build mosques and the requirement that domestic immigrants have special residency and work permits.[87] Some Hindu extremists see Islam and Muslims as a threat to Balinese cultural and religious purity, and warn of the danger of Muslim violence. Memories of the 2002 and 2005 terrorist attacks fuel these sentiments. There is a tendency to view even ethnically Balinese Muslims as "foreigners." The provincial government and elements of the Hindu elite promote an exclusivist Hindu identity based on religious homogeneity

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and politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008).

[85] Meuleman, J., "From New Order to National Disintegration. The Religious Factor between Reality, Manipulation, and Rationalization", (Archipel, 2002); Swazey, K., "A Place for Harmonious Difference: Christianity and the Mediation of Minahasan Identity in the North Sulawesi Public", (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Hawai'i at Manoa, 2013).

[86] Government of Indonesia Ministry of Tourism, "Spectacular Garuda Wisnu Kencana Statue on Bali in Final Stage of Completion." https://www.indonesia.travel/gb/en/news/spectacular-garuda-wisnu-kencana-statue-on-bali-in-final-stage-of-completion, (2018).

[87] Religious minorities often find it difficult to secure permission to build "houses of worship" in many parts of Indonesia because of a 2006 decree by the Ministry of Religion requiring community approval for their construction. Because minorities are geographically localized this means that all religious groups have difficulties securing permission to build houses of worship in areas in which they are minorities. See Crouch, M., "Implementing the Regulation on Places of Worship in Indonesia: New Problems, Local Politics and Court Action", (Asian Studies Review, 2010). This decree was intended to ameliorate religious tension, but has had to opposite effect.

and a return to the "true" Bali.[88] References to *Kebalian* (Balineseness) and slogans such as "Bali for the Balinese" are increasingly common. These sentiments have given rise to a nativist social movement known as *Bali Ajeg* that would severely limit civic pluralism. Bagus observes that this movement shares many exclusivist features with Indonesian Islamism harassing people who fail to comply with newly imagined religious norms.[89] Should it become the dominant force in provincial politics, this nativist symbology would allow only for a limited form of parallel civic pluralism in which other religions, especially Islam, would be subject to increased discrimination.

Balinese Muslims increasingly see themselves as second class citizens. Large Muslim organizations including Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama circumvent regulations limiting mosque construction by using other terms for buildings that are obviously mosques. Many, especially *Salafis*, avoid social encounters with Balinese Hindus. Many feel compelled to explain that they are not extremists or terrorists. These tensions are especially apparent in the Denpasar area where there are substantial numbers of Muslim immigrants from Java, Lombok and Sulawesi. They are less pronounced in the Klungkung area where there are centuries old Muslim communities and much smaller immigrant communities.

Parallel pluralism is symbolized by the Puja Mandala, a religious complex in Nusa Dusa that includes Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches, a Buddhist Temple, a Mosque and a Hindu Balinese Temple. Construction of this inter-faith complex began in 1997. It was not an expression of "grass roots" pluralism but an element President Suharto's strategy to control religion and impose *Pancasila* based civic pluralism.[90] It was also intended to convince tourists that Bali was a peaceful, religiously tolerant destination. It was financed by the Ministry of Religion and the government owned Bali Tourism Development Corporation. Significantly Nusa Dusa is an upmarket self-contained destination resort complex. Puja Mandala is an aspect of the "touristification" or "Disneyfication" of Bali. Promoting pluralism serves to enhance the politically constructed image Bali as an island of tranquillity removed from the conflicts and tensions of modernity. It shows tourists what the Suharto government wanted them to see.

Controversies surrounding the complex indicate that it's symbolism is more pluralistic than Balinese society. Muslim and Christian leaders were more enthusiastic about the project than Hindus for two reasons: First because it acknowledged diversity. Second, it enabled them to build places of worship without going through the arduous permission process. Some Hindus opposed the project because they felt that it would dilute Balinese Hindu identity by moving from diversity to pluralism. Others added a hegemonic

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[88] Allen, P., and Palermo, C., "*Ajeg Bali*: Multiple Meanings, Diverse Agendas," (Indonesia and the Malay World, 2005); Rhoads, E., "Bali Standing Strong", (Inside Indonesia, 2007).

[89] Bagus, M., "Getting the Monkey off Your Back: Women and the Intensification of Religious Identities in Post-bomb Bali, Indonesia", (Women's Studies International Forum, 2010).

[90] Putra, N., *Puja Mandala: An Invented Icon of Balinese Religious Tolerance* (2014); in Hauser-Schäublin, B. and Harnish, D., *Between Harmony and Discrimination: Negotiating Identities within Majority-Minority Relationships in Bali and Lombok* (Leiden: Brill, 2014); On the New Order's attempts to establish a hegemonic Indonesian state symbology see also: Hitchcock, M., "Tourism, *Taman Mini*, and National Identity," (Indonesia and the Malay World, 1998).

gloss to parallel pluralism by mentioning Puja Mandala as a uniquely Balinese example of tolerance and pluralism. Others state that Hinduism requires tolerance of other religions. Apologetics such as these ignore the inconvenient truth that parallel pluralism was established by an authoritarian Muslim regime. They also include tropes of the colonial and contemporary touristic image of Bali as a tranquil spiritual haven.

Conclusions

The cases described in this paper are examples of two very different kinds of civic pluralism. The additive pluralism of Siti Khotijah's tomb borders on theological pluralism. It brings elements of Islam into the state symbology of a Hindu polity. This promoted the development of a pilgrimage site shared by Hindus and Muslims. The religious convergence that brings Hindus and Muslims together does not concern abstract, text based theological propositions, but rather the more mundane, and for pilgrims, more immediate concern with healing. The parallel pluralism of modern Bali is quite different. It is a political necessity designed establish harmonious relationships between bounded religious communities all of which are subordinated to a nominally secular, religiously neutral state. This is perhaps the only viable form of pluralism in a religious environment in which religion is defined in reference to texts based on mutually exclusive metaphysical propositions and truth claims.

More generally, civic pluralism is a strategy for managing the religious difference. Additive pluralism incorporates minorities into hegemonic socio-religious systems in which one religious tradition informs state symbologies and adherents of that tradition control state technologies. It establishes identity spaces for subordinate traditions. It is an attractive option for states in two political contexts. The first is when the state lacks the capacity to establish religious uniformity. The second is when it is the state's interest to make space for religious minorities. Premodern Buddhist states in Southeast Asia used captive Hindu minorities to perform essential rituals. Balinese Hindu states incorporated Muslims and elements of Islam to avoid conflict with Muslim minorities. The hardening of religious boundaries under conditions of modernity has made additive pluralism increasing difficult, if not impossible, for contemporary states. Most, including Indonesia, use some form of parallel pluralism to manage religious difference.

Two theoretical conclusions can be drawn from these observations. The first is that theological pluralism rooted is not a necessary condition for the establishment of civic pluralism and social harmony. The second is that when personal and collective identities are defined in terms of ethnic and/or religion symbologies, neutral, effective state technologies including security forces are a necessary condition for establishing and maintaining civic pluralism.[91]

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[91] Tambiah, S., *Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); *Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

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