Convention Strategy of the Islamic Cultural in Responding to the Wahhabi Movement in Suralaga Village, East Lombok Regency

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ABSTRACT

The presence of Wahhabi ideology within the cultural Islamic society has led to a stark dichotomy, primarily due to the Wahhabi community's puritanical stance that opposes certain religious traditions observed by the broader Islamic community. Specifically, the Wahhabi group rejects customary celebrations on holy days, citing a lack of explicit guidance in the Qur'an and al-Hadith regarding these practices. This study aims to delve into the perceptions of individuals outside the Wahhabi group within Suralaga Village, exploring their responses to Wahhabi lectures and activities. Additionally, it seeks to understand the role played by these individuals in maintaining socio-religious harmony, encompassing the involvement of governmental and religious authorities in the village. The research objectives are multifaceted, aiming not only to comprehend external responses to Wahhabi teachings but also to identify behavioral patterns exhibited by the cultural Islamic community in response to the assertiveness of the Wahhabi movement. Furthermore, the study seeks to uncover the strategies employed by the cultural Islamic community to foster moderate attitudes internally and within the Wahhabi group. The findings of this research illuminate the diverse attitudes embraced by the cultural Islamic community, such as Separation, Acceptance, Abandonment, and the prioritization of social over strict religious affiliations in response to Wahhabi da'wah. Moreover, the approach taken by the cultural Islamic community involves fostering socio-cultural solidarity and socio-political relations with the Wahhabi congregation, showcasing efforts to navigate differences and promote social cohesion while embracing moderation within the community.

Keywords: Convention; Cultural Islamic; Wahabi.
INTRODUCTION

The emergence of Wahhabi ideology within the cultural Islamic society has given rise to a significant problem, fostering a distinct division within the broader Islamic community (Hasan, 2010). This division stems from the puritanical beliefs of the Wahhabi community, which stand in stark contrast to the established religious traditions practiced by the wider Islamic populace. Specifically, a contentious issue revolves around the rejection of customary celebrations held on holy days by the Wahhabi group (Valentine, 2015). They justify their stance by asserting a lack of explicit scriptural guidance in the Qur'an and al-Hadith for these celebratory practices. This rejection directly challenges the prevalent religious customs observed by the larger Islamic community, thereby creating a pronounced schism within the societal fabric. As a consequence, this ideological divergence has led to tensions, disagreements, and differing interpretations of religious teachings, significantly impacting the cultural and religious cohesion traditionally upheld within the broader Islamic society (Marath, 2021). The conflict over these divergent views on religious practices has become a central point of contention, causing rifts and complexities within the cultural Islamic framework, necessitating a deeper exploration and understanding to navigate these contrasting perspectives harmoniously.

The spread of Wahhabi ideology within Suralaga village's Sasak community has caused a shift from tolerance to increased intolerance. This change stems from ideological conflicts between Wahhabi factions and other religious groups, leading to divisions within the once-unified community (Hamdi, 2018). Wahhabi lectures, emphasizing their version of true religious practices and branding others as heretics, have contributed to this division (Barker, 2003). The Wahhabi population has grown due to intensified religious practices and economic empowerment, attracting many former members of other religious sects. Wahhabi teachings criticize traditional Sasak cultural practices integrated with religious rituals, dismissing them as futile or burdensome. These teachings position the Wahhabi group as ideal while suggesting others need development, reinforcing their self-construction while excluding others. Wahhabi indoctrination has led to lifestyle changes symbolized by distinct clothing and appearance, fostering group identity and solidarity (Smith & Hamdi, 2013).

Incidents like burning Wahhabi activity centers and mosques resulted from provocative lectures inciting tensions. Resistance against constructing Wahhabi mosques reflects concerns about ideological conversion. A viral lecture disparaging revered tombs and religious practices sparked outrage by mocking Tain Acong (dog dung) holy tomb, insulting the cleric's contribution to Islam in Lombok. These events revealed deep religious and cultural sensitivities within the Sasak community (Naamy, 2022).

These clashes between traditional Sasak culture and Wahhabi ideals reveal tensions between preserving cultural heritage and adapting to religious changes. It
underscores the need for a delicate balance to maintain societal harmony amid ideological shifts.

Several studies, including "Religious Diversity in Australia: Rethinking Social Cohesion" by Ezzy et al. (2020), "Understanding Sectarianism: Sunni-Shi'a Relations in the Modern Arab World" by Haddad (2020), and "Religious diversity, social cohesion, and the role of interfaith cooperation in resilient global cities" by Banout & Henderson (2018), delve into the dynamics of interfaith relations and their impact on societal cohesion. These studies collectively examine how diverse religious communities interact and perceive each other within societal contexts. However, the research conducted in Suralaga Village uniquely focuses on the specific influence of Wahhabi teachings on cultural Islamic traditions, exploring the responses of non-Wahhabi individuals and the involvement of local authorities in maintaining socio-religious harmony. This localized study provides distinct insights into managing ideological diversity within a particular religious community, offering context-specific strategies to preserve cultural and religious cohesion amidst the challenges posed by evolving beliefs and practices. Its significance lies in its tailored approach, contributing uniquely nuanced insights that complement broader studies on interfaith relations, emphasizing the importance of addressing ideological differences within specific religious communities to foster harmony and understanding.

The research conducted in Suralaga Village to explore the perceptions of individuals outside the Wahhabi group in response to Wahhabi lectures and activities holds significant relevance in understanding the broader societal impact of Wahhabi teachings. By investigating how non-Wahhabi members perceive and respond to these lectures, the study sheds light on the dynamics of ideological dissemination and reception within the community. It unveils the degree of acceptance, rejection, or resistance towards Wahhabi teachings among those not aligned with this ideology, showcasing their role in shaping the socio-religious landscape. Furthermore, understanding the responses of non-Wahhabi individuals is crucial in comprehending the nuanced mechanisms of maintaining socio-religious harmony within the village. The involvement of governmental and religious authorities in this context also becomes pivotal, as their actions or interventions in response to Wahhabi activities can significantly influence community relations and the preservation of religious and cultural cohesion. By elucidating the perceptions and roles of individuals outside the Wahhabi group, this study contributes vital insights into the broader socio-religious dynamics and the efforts to maintain harmony amidst ideological differences within Suralaga Village.

METHODS

The Study employs a qualitative research method and adopts a sociological approach to examine the dynamics between the cultural Islamic community and Wahhabi teachings within Suralaga Village (Huda, 2022; Moleong, 2021). The primary data source centers on understanding the cultural Islamic community's

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attitudes toward Wahhabi teacher lectures and their strategies to bolster a moderate stance. This primary data is gathered directly from the community's responses. Secondary data, comprising demographic information about Suralaga Village, provides contextual background. Additional secondary data will supplement the analysis, offering a more comprehensive understanding. Data collection techniques involve observation, interviews, and documentation. Through these methods, researchers aim to capture firsthand observations, insights from community members through interviews, and relevant documents to thoroughly explore and analyze the interaction between the cultural Islamic community and Wahhabi teachings in the village.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Ustadz Mizan Qudsiyah's lecture as a West Nusa Tenggara Wahhabi figure who is also the son-in-law of H. Husni, the founder of the Wahhabi movement, upon his return from the Middle East, turns out that this was not the only time he criticized the religious traditions of the Sasak people (Said, 2019). In fact, the information that we gathered in his own village in Kalijaga, the congregation was also quite a lot, and once when a family member died, the family held a Tahlilan for the deceased, Mizan Qudsiyah then hit a Dulang (a tray filled with food covered with a woven serving lid) from palm leaves) which will be served to the congregation of Tahlilan because he considers it to be something that is not guided by the Prophet. This extreme attitude of rejecting things that are considered to have no basis in the lectures of Wahhabi figures in NTB is undeniably rooted in the congregation who also blames religious traditions that are different from what they understand in the environment where they live.

The community, which initially quite understood each other with the differences that existed later when the Wahhabi congregation actually triggered friction by blaming established traditions in society, this is the need for a moderate attitude in society to address differences in existing religious views. Wahhabism, with its puritanical mission, sells lectures to congregations and it can be assumed that it is quite difficult to be moderate (but not something that is impossible to do), so its congregations that live in the midst of people who also have different religious views are quite important to instill a positive attitude moderate. This convention strategy in strengthening religious moderation is very important in villages Suralaga can be implemented so that people who are heterogeneous in religious views no longer blame others, then other groups carry out resistance (resistance).

As in the case of the lecture "Keramat Tain Acong" which went viral, it really disturbed the peace of the community until the destruction of the As Sunnah education center headquarters in Bagiq Nyaka was detrimental to the Wahhabi congregation with one car being set on fire, and several other vehicles damaged (Naamy, 2022). The public's anger at MQ did not stop there, criminal charges followed by reporting through legal channels, and volumes of demonstrations in
response to MQ's lectures from various families of the Sasak people who were descended from people whose graves were mentioned in the lecture appeared.

What is very unfortunate then is the attitude of the community which was triggered to take anarchist actions in response to the lecture by the Wahhabi figure. In fact, the demonstrations that continued later not only demanded punishment on MQ, but later turned into demands for the dissolution of the As Sunnah Wahhabi movement in Lombok. The community's response those who are considered excessively demanding the banning of Wahhabism in Lombok is very unfortunate because it actually shows immaturity in society, even in religion. This is the dilemma of cultural Islamic society in dealing with the Wahhabi community. On the one hand they are required to be moderate towards differences in religious interpretation, on the other hand they are pressured by the aggressiveness of the Wahhabis in their movement through elite lectures which blame their exclusivity for disturbing social and religious comfort.

The exaggerated religious extremism of the Wahhabi congregation should be highlighted by a strategy of convention (agreement) in a cultural Islamic society to instill an attitude of religious moderation by appreciating differences especially among fellow Muslims (Mutawali, 2016). For this reason, the strategy of the cultural Islamic community convention in responding to the Wahhabi congregational movement in the three villages as mentioned above is quite important to carry out more in-depth research, because the grassroots community actually becomes victims of intolerant attitudes from each side, both the Wahhabi community and the Cultural Islam.

Understanding the Cultural Clash between Muslims and Wahhabis in West Nusa Tenggara

The interactions between cultural Muslims and Wahhabis in West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) are deeply influenced by a complex interplay of historical, political, economic, and sociocultural dynamics. Historically, Indonesia's religious landscape has been characterized by diverse influences, including syncretic forms of Islam intertwined with local customs and traditions (Wiryomartono, 2020). This syncretism was prevalent in NTB, shaping the cultural Islamic practices deeply rooted in Sasak society. However, the emergence of Wahhabism in the late 20th century, introduced by returning pilgrims and preachers from the Middle East, challenged these syncretic practices (Mishra, 2019). The historical syncretism clashed with the strict interpretations of Wahhabi teachings, leading to ideological tensions and conflicts within the region.

Politically, Indonesia's decentralized governance allows for regional autonomy in religious practices. However, this autonomy can sometimes result in the assertion of specific religious movements, potentially exacerbating tensions between cultural Muslims and Wahhabis. Political influence or support for particular religious groups may impact their visibility and influence within the
community, contributing to the complexities of religious interactions (Brown, 2016).

Economically, initiatives by Wahhabi congregations focusing on economic empowerment could sway followers and enhance their influence within the community. This economic dimension becomes a factor in shaping the dynamics between cultural Muslims and Wahhabis, potentially affecting the adoption of Wahhabi ideologies among certain segments of the population (Crawford, 2014).

Sociocultural norms deeply rooted in Sasak culture form the foundation of cultural Islamic practices. The syncretic blend of Islamic traditions with local customs and rituals was historically embraced and accepted. However, Wahhabi teachings, with their puritanical approach, challenge these syncretic practices. This challenge leads to resistance, debates over religious authenticity, and sometimes friction between the two groups. Social cohesion, mutual understanding, and tolerance historically characterized the region. Still, the imposition of strict Wahhabi teachings can disrupt these established societal norms, creating tensions and divisions within the community (Said, 2019; Valentine, 2015).

The interactions between cultural Muslims and Wahhabis in NTB are deeply influenced by these multifaceted dynamics. The clash between historical syncretism and strict Wahhabi interpretations, combined with political, economic, and sociocultural factors, creates a complex environment. Negotiating these intricate dynamics requires efforts towards promoting religious moderation, fostering understanding, and seeking peaceful coexistence within the region while respecting the diversity of religious beliefs and practices.

**Religious Convention and Moderation Strategy Concept**

Convention is a linguistic term which means agreement. Conventions in this case are social agreements both in the form of systems and territorial areas of each cultural Islamic religious community and Wahhabi groups. This boundary can basically be in the form of geographical boundaries or boundaries of the area of social interaction of the people from both parties. The geographical boundaries in question are the boundaries of the area of movement severity. As in Kaliyaga Village, there are 2 hamlets with a Wahhabi majority, and one of them is almost 100% Wahhabi. While the boundaries of the social interaction area meant are the areas where the two communities meet in one activity but are not flexible in getting along.

The concept of Religious Moderation launched by the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia not only emphasizes religious tolerance across faiths, but also within one belief but different religious interpretations should strengthen religious moderation. So that the conception of Religious Moderation and the intention of its declaration can be achieved properly, namely to minimize social-religious conflict (Said, 2019).

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One thing that has become a criticism of researchers in the concept of religious moderation is that when this concept was acquired as a major government program, it has become something that is continuously echoed in the elite or people with an established level of education, it is quite rare to directly touch the grassroots or communities that experience direct socio-religious conflict. In this case, we can see that in the context of the rejection of the construction of a Wahhabi mosque, even to the demonstration of disbanding the As Sunnah pondok as a follow-up to the Mizan Qudsiyyah lecture in the Mamben Daya community and its surroundings, the religious moderation agents who have been funded by the government have instead held more religious moderation counseling at the elite level with activities in hotels, or in the offices of the Ministry of Religion for civil servants, as if salting sea water. Why don't these religious moderation agents go directly to a society that is experiencing a degradation of tolerance towards other religious groups, and provide a more established understanding to the grassroots community.

For this reason, more research on religious moderation that directly touches the grassroots community should be carried out more. Because the concept of religious moderation which is a government program is not only completed at the elite level with dialogue activities by religious leaders who have gathered, but the dissemination of the concept of moderation that is discussed does not even reach the grassroots where intentional or unconscious intolerance is occurring. by the community, one example is in the case of rejection, and the demonstration of the dissolution of As Sunnah in Lombok.

The link between the concept of convention and moderation in religion is that basically the convention strategy is one of the implementations of the moderation of religion (Suprapto, 2013). In the case of this research, convention strategy is a strategy to anticipate conflict. Basically, the intensity of conflict between the cultural Islamic community and the Wahhabi group has decreased in the last 5 years. However, this issue reappeared in the last 2 years to coincide with the big agenda of international events held in Lombok in the last 2 years. So actually, according to the researchers, this conflict was deliberately raised to reduce or bully the tourists who would be present to witness the international event. Want to frame the media to build the image of Lombok where there are lots of conflicts and violence everywhere. Therefore, this adds to the list of intensity of socio-religious conflicts that occurred in Lombok.

In this case the concept of subculture can also be defined in a group of individuals who build a group power base that is different from the majority. If cultural Islam is the majority community group outside of the Wahhabi congregation as the dominant group, then Wahhabi can be defined as a subculture of Islam that is established in Sasak society. Subculture in the study of Cultural Studies (Saukko, 2003) can be referred to as a group that tries to build a new culture from the dominant culture, but it is also inseparable from this dominant culture. Islam, which is the identity of Sasak Muslims, is the dominant culture with established traditions as a cultural integration, then a variant of Islam with its
puritanism spirit emerged in the Wahhabi group which is also part of the Sasak community. Likewise, Sasak Islam as the dominant culture with the variant of the established Syafii school of thought, but the vision of pure Islam with no sect makes the Wahhabi group a subculture of *ahlussunnah wal jamaah* Islam represented by 4 schools of thought (Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi'i, and Hambali). Meanwhile, in the Wahhabi congregation, although they use the As Sunnah terminology to refer to groups, because of their disapproval of the Wahhabi-Salafi terminology, in reality they also don't seem to want to be bound by the four schools of thought.

From this it can be drawn a common thread, in the local context of the people of Suralaga, the Wahhabi group has almost become dominant, and this can be interpreted as a subculture that is actually entering a dominant cultural phase, so that a society that is defined as cultural Islam is even more pressured by the rapid development of the Islamic subculture, namely the Wahhabi group. However, regarding the attitude of the cultural Islamic community towards this difference, this is certainly not something that is considered vital to further assert identity, but as long as the Wahhabi group also does not raise criticism of the activities of the *amaliah* worship of people outside of them, of course there is nothing to worry about for people who do not affiliate with the Wahhabi group (Rohmaniyah & Woodward, 2012).

**Religious Social Interaction between the Islamic Cultural Society and the As-Sunnah-Wahhabi Congregation**

As the majority group, the non-Wahhabis are of course well-established with different views on *amaliah* worship which in this case is indoctrinated through recitations by religious leaders in the respective organizations they join. Although organizational fanaticism still exists, it has to do with congregational bases that apply to establish elite positions in the organization or when there are political moments. Furthermore, the social-religious interaction of the Sasak people, of course, before it was split into religious organizations and now split into religious sects, was a single group with an established religious culture with a Sufistic pattern, one of which can be traced through the Islamic concept of Wetu Telu, which contextualizes all lines of life in three entities. More intense interaction is of course in a social context when the community is quite well-established in terms of helping each other, helping each other. But when access to education, the economy, and even politics is getting more and more established, the interaction preferences that were originally solid are slowly fading away. Even when political choices are different, religious organizations are also different, it also influences social interactions, as well as the religious interactions of the people.

The Wahhabi congregation and non-Wahhabism or cultural Islam in this case are perceived as groups that try to dominate with the majority side while the Sasak people also have the right to determine which religious side of the group, they are more established to follow. Meanwhile, the cultural Islamic community also perceives that the Wahhabi group is intensively building religious bases through the economy, socially, to compete for influence and to increase the number
of community members who join their group. In terms of religious interaction, when the Wahhabi group does not yet have a specific base for their community, of course, they will mingle with society in general. The mosque which is the medium of da’wah when they are a minority will certainly follow the congregation in the community. One thing that should be proud of the Wahhabi group is their consistency in congregating and filling the mosque every time. However, this often occurs in contestation with the majority of the congregation, for example they enthusiastically carry out congregational prayers every time they have to go to the mosque, with high intensity congregational prayers, one time when the prayer priest is not present, they immediately advance to become priests. Likewise, one time if the preacher is unable to attend, they will be appointed as a substitute. From there they began to get a place to promote their puritan Islamic mission. From behind slowly towards the pulpit as said Prof. Abdul Wahid (2020) sees the mosque phenomenon as an arena for ideological contestation between cultural Muslims and Wahhabi congregation.

In fact, in a social-religious context, it is quite rare for cultural Islamic groups to enter or be involved in the activities of Wahhabi groups. In this case the exclusivity constructed by them does not seem to provide space for groups outside of them to mingle more deeply in the religious activities being carried out. Meanwhile, in the context of interaction between cultural Muslims and them, they are always involved in religious activities in society. Although they sometimes do not agree with what the community is doing. For example, in the tradition of tahlilan for the dead, remembrance and prayer at funerals, they are still invited to attend. Likewise, when they still mingle with the community in one mosque, they sometimes participate in religious events at the mosque, even though they sometimes don't enjoy dishes when they are served.

There was also a time when the Wahhabi group at the elite level criticized the traditions of remembrance for the dead on the pretext of burdening the family, bid’ah was not exemplified by the prophet, but at the grassroots level which was originally established with this tradition, when an event was invited to give food to the deceased. still followed. This means that the flexibility of the congregation at the grassroots level is still quite tolerant with them attending events in the community. Of course, this interaction is not only symbolic to show the face of the Wahhabi group or tolerant cultural Muslims, but because the egalitarian basis of Sasak society has actually been established for quite a long time. So, when they have different organizations, different understandings of sects are not strong enough to undermine egalitarian attitudes and community solidarity.

Saipul Hamdi, one of the elites of the cultural Islamic community in Suralaga, said that the infiltration carried out by the Wahhabi group through socio-economic donations, business assistance was quite successful in attracting people’s interest to become part of their group. Likewise with the intensity of the studies that are held even up to 3 times a week, this makes people who are thirsty for spirituality and religious scholarship then switch to halaqah recitation. This fact should be
anticipated by the elites of cultural Islamic organizations to maintain their congregational base which is increasingly being eroded into the Wahhabi group. By strengthening the economic base of the grassroots community, of course it will be easy to attract them to join the Wahhabi group, moreover, this cultural Islamic society seems to be neglected by the elites at the center of the organization they follow.

Funny things even often happen, for example when they criticize the celebration of the Prophet's birthday. as heresy, but when invited to have a meal at the neighbor's house that held the maulid no more criticism arose. In fact, there is nothing to worry about in interaction in a social context, bearing in mind that people who need each other are of course also inseparable from their daily relationships. However, in the interaction of religious activities, more often than not, cultural Islamic societies take a symbolic interactionism approach to maintain community cohesion without barriers constructed through heretical discourses, without guidance, must return to the Qur'an and Sunnah as continuously echoed by Wahhabi group. In fact, if you want to be criticized further, who is the discourse on returning to the Qur'an and Sunnah aimed at, bearing in mind that the community has never abandoned the Qur'an and Sunnah, even the transformation of traditions and culture of the Sasak people can be said to be closer to the Islamic side referring to Al-Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet Saw.

Meanwhile, the views of Wahhabism regarding social-religious interactions with cultural Islamic communities are actually quite flexible, especially when they are still within the scope of a place of worship. They tend to follow what is established in society, although they often avoid these traditions. The case of Mizan Qudsiyah, for example, as the Wahhabi elite prohibited tahliyan events by providing large portions of food when a family member died. The difference with the grassroots congregation, of course, cannot be ignored because they as elites can be directly under the coordination of the Wahhabi center from Saudi Arabia for the management of donors for the development of Wahhabism ideology. One example is when the Wahhabi congregation with their high enough intensity attends the congregation at the mosque, during the dawn prayer when the Imam performs the qunut prayer, they still straighten their hands, or when the Tasyahud ends, the Imam and other worshipers straighten their forefingers, but the Wahhabi congregation instead moves -move it.

Another Wahhabi elite, Ustadz Jamiluddin Abu Arika views the traditions carried out by cultural Muslim communities as something that is sometimes burdensome, even though he was initially established with these traditions in his hometown. Through his Facebook page he has been quite aggressive in criticizing things that people do that are not the same as their understanding, including the tradition of birthdays, remembrance for the dead, to the handing over of the relics of the deceased to the village kyai (peseraq-an). This perception certainly raises contestation in society, on the one hand they are established with traditions that have been passed down from generation to generation, on the other hand those who
are already part of the Wahhabi group are encouraged to let go of these things as a form of purification of Islam.

Cultural Islam represented through local-level religious organizations such as NW, NWDI, Maraqitta'limat, Al Mukhtariyah is also quite aware of the rapid development of the Wahhabi congregation, one of which is through social activities and economic development. Badrul Wajdi as part of the NWDI elite in Suralaga also sees the need to fortify the congregation in relation to the ahlussunnah wal jamaah ala mazhabil Imam Syafi’i faith, but in the context of social interaction and other muamalah he says there is no need to limit things, considering the brothers and sisters in The Wahhabi congregation is one of the Sasak brothers and one religion. However, in interactions with the implementation of religious traditions in Suralaga, recitations, for example, actually make each community still strong in their fanaticism towards religious figures in their group. For example, the cultural Muslim community does not attend recitations held by Wahhabi groups, while there are also Wahhabi congregations who sometimes attend recitations filled with non-Wahhabism figures.

The same thing was expressed by Mujadalah Turmuzi, one of the teachers at the Unwanul Falah Suralaga Islamic Boarding School, for example, by comparing the education provided by the Wahhabi group through Pondok As Sunnah, which is actually the same as that provided at the Islamic boarding school where he is involved. However, in recent years the Suralaga community's enthusiasm for sending their children to Pondok as Sunnah is quite high, moreover they are covered for costs, and often hold social activities to help the community, one of which is through compensation for distributing groceries, providing iftar on Monday-Thursday and others. This is certainly an attraction for more and more cultural Muslim congregations to join the Wahhabi group, especially with business assistance for parents of students who want to open a business to earn daily income and also with the slogan of avoiding usury.

The Response of the Cultural Islamic Society to the Wahhabi As-Sunnah Da'wah

The emergence of the Wahhabi movement and the massive development of its da’wah since 1984 have made this community have a large number of followers. In Suralaga Village with a population of 7,647, 12.3% is a Wahhabi community, more precisely a hamlet where around 941 people live are members of the Wahhabi community. Suralaga village and even the Wahhabi group controlled the village's political arena. Basically, the aggressiveness of the Wahhabi movement in Suralaga Village was not shown in terms of area and governance. However, the fact that the Suralaga village head and several village officials are Wahhabi members cannot be denied. This is quite astonishing and has different characteristics compared to other villages where the Wahhabis are based.

For now, the cultural Islamic community prefers not to touch the theological area. Because the khilafiyah is so very contrasting that it colors the pattern of

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relations between these two camps. Prolonged disputes have bored the cultural Islamic community to continue to respond with resistance. Even though at the beginning of the entry of the movement there was enormous resistance among the cultural Islamic community. However, because those who brought this movement were very influential figures, many people could not show their resistance to this movement. That is what causes the development of the Wahhabi group to be so big until now.

This can be seen from the responses of several interviewees who were very relaxed in dealing with the movement. Ustad H. Sohariah Hamzah, who is a religious leader in Suralaga Village, only responded by announcing the khilafiyah that existed between cultural Islam and Wahhabism. He revealed:

"Differences in understanding are normal because of the differences in the books we are studying, the important thing is that we carry out our worship according to the Sharia. And we continue to provide understanding to our congregation with recitations." (interviewed, Ustadz Sohariah Hamzah on September 4, 2022)

This shows that resistance to khilafiyah for religious leaders has reached saturation. Khilafiyah which usually creates conflict or debate is no longer interesting to do in the current conditions. The cultural Islamic community and even its religious leaders have been able to find khilafiyah among them. Even using "common" language makes this khilafiyah one of the social realities that occur in society. Social reality that cannot be denied emerges over time after going through various disputes among the people. The dispute that finally made the cultural Islamic community realize that this khilafiyah was no longer a realm to be continuously debated.

Even academics are quite aware that the social reality, in this case, is that khilafiyah is a factor causing disharmony. So according to one academic in Suralaga Village stated that:

““The problems of theological differences that often become the content of Wahhabi lectures/recitations are the cause of disharmony in our social life, that's what causes our congregations to accuse each other without understanding the background of the differences.” (Interviewed, Munayidul Hifzi on September 18, 2022)

This statement came from a source who is an academic and has been observing the Wahhabi movement in Suralaga Village for a long time. Basically the people of Suralaga Village just accept the Wahhabi community that enters. Given the history of the emergence of this group is also not in an outsider condition that enters the social structure of society. The phenomenon of the emergence of Wahhabism is more about the people's thirst for religious spirituality. This thirst for spirituality is then treated with a purification mission so that people who are thirsty for spirituality can very easily accept and follow a high commitment to this
purification. Can be analogous to someone who is very thirsty and needs a drink. However, so far the drinks consumed are sweet drinks or carbonated drinks, so the thirst for fresh and healthy water (according to them) is much more needed. Coupled with the lure of healthier and fresher water, it can support physical and spiritual health.

This was the situation in the people of Suralaga Village before the emergence of the Wahhabi movement where this movement also took advantage of the loyalty of Tuan Guru H Abdul Manan's followers, in this case his son Tuan Guru H. Husni who had just returned from the Middle East and then spread the teachings. It is not difficult to get the attention and loyalty of his father's congregation because besides the typology of the people of NTB in general and Lombok in particular, they have very high fanaticism towards a religious figure. Even though at this time the charisma of religious figures has begun to fade, speaking of NTB in general and Lombok in particular, the charisma of Tuan Guru can defeat common sense and even one's ability to think humanly. Likewise with what happened to the people of Suralaga Village, the charisma of the teacher or religious figure who was so trusted by the community was very easy to accept his preaching. Likewise with the development of Wahhabism in Suralaga Village.

The cultural Islamic community and members of the Wahhabi community grow and develop together in the Suralaga Village area. Although basically territorially both of them separated. Both the cultural Islamic community and the Wahhabi community naturally separate themselves so that friction or disputes do not continue to occur. Theological differences which are fundamental things that are inherent in society when there is a meeting, disharmony will always appear. So, as stated by sources from academic circles, this disharmony actually arose because of khilafiyah that occurred between the two.

According to this academician's view, the theological differences that often form the content of lectures/recitations by Wahhabi figures are the basis for disharmony so that many people accuse each other without knowing the root of the differences. So that if people know the roots of these differences, then people will understand and not accuse each other and misunderstand each other like that. This means that if people understand that the books they read are different, the references that form the basis of their lives are different, then people will understand how these differences arose later. Therefore, the community should also be given enlightenment regarding these differences, the different books they read, the different textual interpretations they receive. So that when the cultural Islamic community knows this, mutual accusations will at least decrease.

This is in line with the responses of sources from religious leaders and academics. How does the lack of mutual understanding of the community become the root of the problem of disharmony between communities. However, if we look at the response, it means that the convention strategy adopted by multicultural societies is very weak because until now they still do not fully understand these theological differences. Cultural Islamic society only understands that they are
different in terms of social interaction, while the theological foundations of cultural Islamic society still do not get a clear understanding.

The fact is that the theological foundations of society in general do not really understand. They only understand how religious social practices should be. Given that da'wah Islamiyah is carried out in a normative and practical way, academic Islamic studies are minimal among grassroots cultural Muslim communities. So that they only know religious teachings that are not permissible and permissible.

However, only with this capital, the community can respond that the Wahhabi movement is not good, even if its preaching uses violence and bad words. Moreover, insulting or demeaning established social traditions is done. This theological difference should be conveyed politely or with more subtle choices of diction rather than using rather harsh dictions. The Wahhabi community is not a movement whose spirit is extremism. What makes extremist movements visible is the way they convey messages of theological meaning that they understand with intonation of violence and strong diction choices to influence people's mindsets.

Looking at the typology of the community, especially the people of Suralaga Village, they are not people who like violence. Especially with this puritanism mission not advocating the use of violence or resistance but only intending to invite a return to "the pure". So that when viewed from the mission of the missionary packaging, the cultural Islamic community can accept their existence. As the response conveyed by some congregations regarding their response to the existence of the Wahhabi group stated that:

"Indeed, we often hear Wahhabi recitations that irritate us, we often mention those of us who are hiziban, tahlilan, then the microphone is loud so we can hear it." (Interviewed with Zirhatun on September 18, 2022).

The community's response was not in the context of rejection, but rather the cultural Islamic community felt that they wanted the Wahhabi group in Suralaga Village not to openly show and address these differences. Such an attitude settles like a ticking time bomb. Basically, khilafiyah always exists wherever religious communities exist, but what distinguishes it is whether the community shows it with a wise attitude or not. In this context, small community groups like this should not be so violent so that they can move more freely, especially with their recruitment mission. However, due to their unwise attitude in approaching people outside of them, the development of this group after the big conflict in 2021 has become more unwieldy and slower than before.

CONCLUSION

Cultural Islamic community demonstrated an awareness of religious moderation, primarily influenced by social agreements and the necessity to accommodate differences within their societal context. This acceptance, however, was not rooted in a genuine understanding of moderate religious attitudes but rather
a response to unavoidable social realities. Despite normative rejection from the Wahhabi group, the cultural Islamic community's socio-cultural and socio-political approaches remained effective and accommodating, steering clear of conflictual territories. Hence, the convention strategy of the cultural Islamic society seemed more inclined toward acknowledging and adapting to the prevailing social reality to naturally embody a moderate attitude. The notion of religious moderation, inherent in societal development, is seen as nascent, akin to a seed requiring nurture to grow into a robust tree. However, researchers caution that these seeds might represent seeds of contention or discord, emphasizing the crucial need for complete awareness and education about religious moderation to prevent conflict. The study contrasts this societal acceptance with a multicultural academic setting, where complete awareness of religious moderation is prevalent. This difference aligns with findings from the Ministry of Religion's survey, indicating that individuals accustomed to multicultural environments tend to exhibit more comprehensive understanding and practice of moderation compared to those in homogeneous settings, who may struggle when faced with diverse beliefs and practices despite having a theoretical grasp of moderation.

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